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Abstract
Recent research has been devoting increasing attention to prove-
nance, or information describing the origin, derivation, and his-
tory of data, due to its relevance to critical issues including trans-
parency, privacy, and security. Engineering a software system to
make it provenance-aware by means of ad-hoc instrumentation
requires a substantial effort: the development of general-purpose
infrastructure is thus very important to achieve the goal of mak-
ing provenance widely available. In this article we describe a core
functional language equipped with a provenance-aware semantics
that is sufficiently generic to accomodate many notions of prove-
nance proposed in the literature. While existing proposals typically
treat provenance views and provenance extraction as second-class,
extralinguistic mechanisms, in our work provenance views are ex-
pressed as standard programs and provenance data can be reflected
into the language, allowing for programs that inspect their own
provenance.
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1 Introduction
It is typical of young children to believe what they are told without
requiring deep explanations: through experience, human beings
learn that not all information can be trusted, and that some sources
deserve trust, while other sources do not. But even trustworthy
sources can make mistakes, which means that when we learn new
information, we cannot decide whether to believe it or not based
on its origin only, but we need to consider how it was processed
to decide if it is reliable. In the absence of this knowledge, we may
decide not to believe something, even if true.
The accurate description of the origin, history, and derivation
of some information has been known for decades, initially in the
archival community [2, 20], as provenance, but it has clearly been
studied by philosophers of knowledge for a much longer time. Even
though provenance is ubiquitous, it is essential to the development
of scientific knowledge: raw experimental data is useless without a
thorough explanation of how it was obtained, allowing the public
to reproduce the experiment (at least in principle) and confirm it
or contradict it. Data collection and processing was originally an
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entirely human activity (and scientists had to keep an accurate
record of it); by means of computer systems, it is now possible to
process much greater quantities of data in an efficient way.
Computer systems do not, however, provide the provenance
of the data they process for free: propagating it from the input
to the output, while logging all intermediate operations, requires
additional code; and more code means not only more effort, but
also more occasions to introduce bugs.
For these reasons, a line of research has devoted its attention to
automated techniques to record provenance. Many of these tech-
niques are designed to be employed in interesting but restricted
settings (especially scientific workflow computation [4, 11, 18, 21]
and databases [3, 6, 10, 13, 14]).
In a 2013 paper [1], Acar et al. have laid the basis for track-
ing provenance in a general-purpose programming language, by
proposing a core functional calculus (Transparent ML, or TML)
equipped with a provenance extraction framework. They provide
a tracing big-step semantics, which records the history (or trace)
of computation; by analysing this trace, the extraction framework
is able to “replay” the computation, while at the same time propa-
gating provenance annotations from the source expression to the
final value. They show that TML and its provenance framework
are expressive enough to extract many forms of provenance.
Despite this, in TML provenance remains, so to say, a second
class citizen: the extraction framework is not, strictly speaking,
part of the language, but an external layer combining several user-
provided functions (provenance views) to process annotations and
an execution trace and return the provenance; neither the views,
nor the annotations, nor the execution trace are expressed as TML
terms. Secondly, traces appear as an unneeded intermediate step,
as the extraction framework is required to replay them, essentially
executing the program a second time. Furthermore, TML traces
closely reflect the big-step semantics of the language, limiting im-
plementations to a call-by-value strategy and essentially requiring
provenance inspection to take place after the execution of the pro-
gram, and making self-inspecting programs impossible.
1.1 Summary
We take inspiration from TML and develop a more tightly inte-
grated provenance inspection calculus (PIC), in which provenance is
expressed as, and manipulated by first-class terms of the language.
In this paper, we provide the following contributions:
• a core functional calculus with special constructs to manip-
ulate syntactic locations (concretely represented as lists of
integers)
• language types for provenance labellings and provenance
transducers (functions transforming provenance), together
with a rich set of combinators
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• a small-step, traceless semantics associating to each com-
putation step the corresponding provenance transducer
• a simplified framework to define provenance views as lan-
guage expressions
• an inspection construct allowing reflective reasoning on
provenance
Outline. Section 2 introduces some basic notions about prove-
nance. The syntax and semantics of PIC is introduced in Section 3,
along with the provenance combinators. In Section 4 we provide a
framework for the simplified definition of provenance views. Sec-
tion 5 integrates PIC with an inspection construct and discusses
the full language with an extensive example. Finally in Section 6
we draw conclusions and discuss future work.
2 Background
Provenance is most easily defined informally, as a form of meta-
data describing the origin or history of an artifact, or the process
by which it has been constructed. As soon as we try to make this
concept more formal, we realize that it depends on choices which
are, to a certain degree, arbitrary: the origin of data can include an
identifier of the person or organization that provided it; a descrip-
tion of the technical equipment that produced it, along with its
accuracy; a timestamp; localization information from a GPS sensor;
etc. Likewise, the computational process manipulating data can be
described with various levels of precision.
Since the choice of relevant provenance information is largely a
human task, we do not expect a single, universally acceptable notion
of provenance. It is however clear that any notion of provenance, to
be mechanized, requires facilities to annotate input and output data
with metadata, along with a way to analyze the execution history
of a software system.
The core calculus TML [1] satisfies these requirements by pro-
viding a big-step tracing semantics, with evaluation judgments in
the following form:1
M ⇓ V , t
The judgment evaluates M and produces a result V and a trace t ,
which is a data structure describing the computation that produced
V (with a slight approximation, t can be considered a linearized
version of the evaluation tree). In this setting, the evaluation of an
arithmetic expression N1 + N2 takes the following form:
N1 ⇓ 2, t1 N2 ⇓ 3, t2 +ˆ(2, 3) = 5
N1 + N2 ⇓ 5, t1 + t2
where t1 + t2 is the trace expressing the evaluation of a sum whose
two arguments have histories described, respectively, by t1 and t2,
and +ˆ is the meta-language sum. The evaluation of a larger term
yields a more complex trace:
N1 ⇓ 2, t1 N2 ⇓ 3, t2 +ˆ(2, 3) = 5
N1 + N2 ⇓ 5, t1 + t2 N3 ⇓ 1, t3
⟨N1 + N2,N3⟩ ⇓ ⟨5, 1⟩, ⟨t1 + t2, t3⟩
fst(⟨N1 + N2,N3⟩) ⇓ 5, fst(⟨t1 + t2, t3⟩)
TML provides a framework to extract various forms of prove-
nance from traces: the user annotates the source termwith primitive
provenance information and passes it, along with the execution
trace, to a provenance view which, basically, replays the computa-
tion while at the same time propagating the annotations. Views are
1For simplicity, we omit evaluation environments.
TML’s way of allowing a user to define several notions of prove-
nance: if we annotate the original term as fst(⟨N a11 + N a22 ,N a33 ⟩a4 ),
and we want the provenance of the final value to reflect that of all
the portions of the input on which it depends (dependency prove-
nance [9]), it is possible to define, by structural recursion on the
execution trace, a view that will return 5a1∪a2∪a4 . Notice that the
framework is an external facility: annotations do not have to be
TML terms, and views are defined as set-theoretic functions (al-
though it is implied that they should be computable).
Other forms of provenance that can be expressed in TML include:
• where-provenance [7], which provides labels identifying
the input location from which each portion of an expression
was copied;
• expression provenance [1], whose labels are expression
graphs or trees describing how a value was computed in
terms of primitive operations.
Motivated by the limitations of TML, we set out to embed the
extraction framework into the language itself: as we started investi-
gating the issue of allowing provenance extraction within programs,
we realized that evaluating a sub-program to obtain its trace and
then processing its trace with a provenance view, essentially eval-
uating it a second time, made little sense; it should be possible to
compute the provenance applying a view immediately, without
materializing the execution trace as an intermediate step. To ac-
complish this task, we decided to replace traces with transducers,
or functions that transform provenance according to a certain exe-
cution history. A major obstacle in defining transducers is the need
to undo the substitutions created by the evaluation of functions
or pattern matching: to address it, we equip the language with a
special relocation operator.
One property of transducers is that they can be combined by
functional composition to obtain the transducer corresponding to
express a transitivity rule. This allows us to adopt a small-step
semantics, which can be used to reason on the provenance of non-
terminating programs.2
3 A provenance-aware calculus
We define the provenance inspection calculus PIC, a pure functional
language equipped with a reduction semantics and extended with
facilities to annotate expressions with provenance and propagate
it during the computation. Its syntax, shown in Fig. 1, includes a
standard type system, with primitive types B (including the single-
ton type 1, booleans B, and natural numbers N), pairs, functions,
and lists and optional values on a base type σ (respectively [σ ] and
∼σ ).
The definition of expressions is based on a standard approach.
One thing to note is that we parametrize the syntax and seman-
tics over primitive constants c and primitive operations ⊕, whose
arguments must be of primitive types. We assume that constants in-
clude booleans tt and ff and natural numbers 0, 1, 2 . . .; primitive
operations include, among other, standard arithmetic operations
and the equality test on natural numbers ?=.
We fix a multi-sorted signature Σ, containing type declarations
for constants (e.g.: c : σ ) and primitive operations (⊕ : −→τm ⊃ τ ′,
where −→τm is a sequence of m types τ1, . . . ,τm ). Each operation
2A small-step semantics of TML was originally considered for this precise reason, but
left for future work. In the words of its proponents, “moving to a small-step semantics
[seems] likely to complicate the trace semantics (and subsequent analysis) considerably”.
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Prim. types B ::= 1 | B | N | . . .
Types σ ,τ ::= B | σ × τ | σ ⊃ τ | [σ ] | ∼σ
Contexts Γ ::= [x1 : τ1, . . . ,xn : τn]
Expressions L,M,N ::= c | x | M N | f (x ).M | ⊕(−→M )
| • |∼M | ϵ | M # N | caseM of π
|fst(M ) | snd(M ) | ⟨M,N ⟩ | ρ (−→x .M )
Patterns π ::= {tt 7→ M ; ff 7→ N }
|{• 7→ M ;∼x 7→ N } | {ϵ 7→ M ;x # y 7→ N }
Views F ::= ⟨Mβ ,Mfst,Msnd,M•,M∼,
Mϵ ,M#,Mtt,Mff,M⊕⟩
Values U ,V ::= c | x | • | ∼U | ϵ | U #V | ⟨U ,V ⟩
| f (x ).M | ρ (−→x .M )
Figure 1. Syntax of the language
symbol ⊕ be associated to a metalanguage function ⊕ˆ from values
to values, expressing its semantics, thus defining an algebra for Σ.
Expressions f (x ).M represent recursive functions f with formal
argument x and body M , where both f and x are bound in M ;
non-recursive lambda-expressions λx .M are treated as recursive
functions _(x ).M , under the condition that the irrelevant function
name _ is free inM .
For optional values and lists, we use the following notation: an
expression of type ∼σ can be obtained either by encapsulating
someM of type σ using the syntax ∼M , or by means of the “none”
constructor represented by •; list constructors include the empty
list ϵ and the cons operationM#N . For explicit lists, we will use the
notation [M1; . . . ;Mk ], which is syntactic sugar forM1 # . . .#Mk #ϵ .
Two case analysis constructs are used to decompose lists and
optional values; similarly, case analysis also supports reasoning on
booleans. We will allow ourselves to use an extended case analysis
notation, which should be considered syntactic sugar:
caseM of
{ϵ 7→ N1
; 1 # l1 7→ N2
; 2 # 1 # l2 7→ N3
; _ 7→ N4}
caseM of
{ϵ 7→ N1
;h1 # l1 7→ case h ?= 1 of
{tt 7→ N2
; ff 7→ case h1 ?= 2 of
{tt 7→ case l1 of
{ϵ 7→ N4
;h2 # l2 7→ case h1 ?= 2 of
{tt 7→ N3
ff 7→ N4}
}
; ff 7→ N4}
}
}
As an example, we can use recursion and case analysis to define
a list map function of type (N ⊃ N) ⊃ [N] ⊃ [N] as follows:
map := λ f .mapf (l ).case l of
{ϵ 7→ ϵ
;h#t 7→ ( f h)#(mapf t )}
The main feature of PIC is that its semantics is expressed by
reduction judgments in the following form:
F ⊢ M T↪−→ N
The intended reading is that M reduces to N ; additionally, F is a
parameter describing a provenance view, or a set of rules that express
how the initial provenance data contributes to the final provenance,
and T is a provenance transducer, a normal language expression
that, given provenance data forM , returns the provenance for N .
The reduct N does not depend on the view F , therefore we will
writeM ↪→ N whenwe evaluate an expression, but have no interest
in its provenance; on the other hand, T is constructed based on the
content of F : thus different views will produce different transducers.
One last expression kind, which we introduce in this calculus, is
the relocation ρ (−→x .M ), of type [N] ⊃ [N]. This operation, which ex-
presses a mapping from locations in a (simultaneously) substituted
term M
[−→
N
/−→x ] to locations in its components M,−→N , cannot be
defined in terms of other language constructs and is thus taken as
primitive. Notice that, since this mapping depends on the syntactic
structure ofM , no evaluation can take place within ρ.
To explain how relocations work, we first need to formally de-
scribe what locations are and how they are manipulated in our
language: this is the purpose of the next section.
3.1 Locations
A syntactic location is an entity that can be used to denote a specific
subexpression within a larger language expression. We want to
express provenance as a labelling, i.e. a function assigning a label
to each location in an expression; it should also be possible to
represent such labellings as language expressions, thus we need to
provide a representation for locations as well.
We choose to represent syntactic locations by means of lists of
natural numbers: given M , a list [n1, . . . ,nk ] identifies one of its
subexpressions N by means of the abstract syntax tree path leading
to N from the root ofM ; each number ni in the list means that the
next node in the path is the ni -th child of the current node; the root
location is represented by the empty list ϵ .
For better clarity, we will write Loc rather than [N] when lists
of natural numbers are used as locations: however, this is just a
presentational choice, and the two notations express the same type.
Since different expressions may have a different structure, not
all locations are valid for all expressions – in fact, the only location
valid for all expressions is the root ϵ . The set of locations valid for
a certain expressionM (which cannot be expressed as a type) will
be represented by means of the following meta-operation locs(M ):
locs(c ) = locs(x ) = locs(•) = locs(ϵ ) = locs(ρ (−→x .M )) = {ϵ }
locs( f (x ).M ) = locs(fst(M )) = locs(snd(M )) = locs(∼M )
= {ϵ } ∪ (1 # locs(M ))
locs(M N ) = locs(⟨M,N ⟩) = locs(M # N )
= {ϵ } ∪ (1 # locs(M )) ∪ (2 # locs(N ))
locs(caseM1 of {_ 7→ M2; _ 7→ M3}))
= {ϵ } ∪ (⋃i=1...3 i # locs(Mi ))
locs(⊕(−→Mn )) = {ϵ } ∪ (⋃i=1...n i # locs(Mi ))
where we have abused the cons notation to apply it to sets of
terms S as follows:
n # S ≜ {n # M : M ∈ S}
A lookup meta-operation M ℓ computes the subterm of M to
which the location ℓ points; if, while scanning M , the operation
reaches a variable before consuming the whole location, it returns
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the variable together with the remaining, unconsumed part of the
location. The location lookup operation is defined in Fig. 2.
In all other cases, the location is inconsistent with the term being
scanned and lookup is undefined.
Given a location ℓN valid forN , we can obtain the corresponding
location ℓ valid for ⟨M,N ⟩ as ℓ = 2 # ℓN . More generally, given a
composite n-ary expression k (M1, . . . ,Mn ) = k (
−→
Mn ), we can map
locations for Mi into locations for k (
−→
Mn ) by means of a location
injection ILocn .i = λℓ. i # ℓ.
Dually, a location for k (−→Mn ) can be processed by case analysis
as follows: we map the root location ϵ to a given N of type τ ;
moreover, for each i = 1, . . . ,n, we provide a function pi from Loc
to a fixed type τ which is used to map locations i # ℓ for the i-th
subexpressions to pi ℓ. This case analysis, which we call location
elimination, can be expressed as a term of the language, which we
will refer to as ELocn .
3.2 Labels and provenance labellings
A provenance labelling for an expressionM is a function that maps
all locations valid forM to expressions of an arbitrary option type
∼τ , where • is taken to represent a default, non-informative label.
Wewill denote the type of τ -valued labellings by Provτ = Loc ⊃ ∼τ ;
we will also allow ourselves to write Prov when the intended τ is
obvious. We will use the metavariables a and a˜, possibly decorated
with subscripts or superscripts, to denote base labels and optional
labels respectively.
In general, we will define provenance labellings only for the loca-
tions in locs(M ), even though our type system does not guarantee
that labellings will be applied consistently: we assume that when-
ever a labelling is not explicitly defined for a location, it returns •.
The default labelling λ_.• will be denoted by ⊥.
The labelling for a composite n-ary expression k (−→Mn ) can be
obtained by putting together labellings pi for every sub-expression
Mi , and providing an additional label a for the root. The correspond-
ing n-ary labelling injection operator IProvn has the same definition
of the location elimination ELocn .
Dually, a labelling for a composite expression k (−→Mn ) induces
a labelling for each of its sub-expressionsMi . The corresponding
labelling projections EProvn .i are defined as λp.p ◦ ILocn .i : they compose
a labelling p for k (−→Mn ) with the i-th location injection ILocn .i .
3.3 Provenance transducers
The way a labelling is transformed by evaluation allows us to ex-
press different kinds of provenance, including where-provenance,
dependency provenance, and expression provenance: whenever an
x ℓ = x , ℓ M ϵ = M, ϵ ⊕(−→Mn )i#ℓ = Mi ℓ
( f (x ).M )1#ℓ = M ℓ (M1 M2)i#ℓ = Mi ℓ ⟨M1,M2⟩i#ℓ = Mi ℓ
fst(M )1#ℓ = M ℓ snd(M )1#ℓ = M ℓ (∼M )1#ℓ = M ℓ
(M1 # M2)i#ℓ = Mi ℓ
caseM1 of {_ 7→ M2; _ 7→ M3}i#ℓ = Mi ℓ
Figure 2. Location lookup
expression M reduces to N , there should be a way to transform
any labelling forM into a labelling for N . This transformation will
be expressed intra-linguistically, by means of functions of type
Provτ ⊃ Provτ which we call provenance transducers; this type will
be also written Transτ for short.
Rather than defining an ad-hoc transducer for each possible
reduction, which would be of little use, we will give rules to synthe-
size transducers based on the reduction rules of the language: for
example, we will have a transducer for the reduction of function
application, two transducers for the two reductions of case analysis
over option types, and similarly two transducers for case analysis
over lists, etc.
In the special case of congruence rules, the corresponding trans-
ducer will not be provided by the user: the language provides default
transducers that reflect the administrative nature of these rules.
For example, given a transducer T for the reductionM ↪→ M ′, the
transducer for the congruence reduction M N ↪→ M ′ N can and
should be obtained by lifting T .
In general, given a reduction Mi ↪→ M ′i and a corresponding
transducer T , the transducer for the congruence
k (M1, . . . ,Mi , . . . ,Mn ) ↪→ k (M1, . . . ,M ′i , . . . ,Mn ) must perform
the following actions:
1. obtain a labelling p for the full unreduced expression;
2. apply labelling projections to obtain the labellingsp1, . . . ,pn
for each of the sub-expressionsM1, . . . ,Mn ;
3. apply T to pi to obtain a labelling forM ′i ;
4. use the labelling injection IProvn to compose the new la-
belling forM ′i with the old labellings for the unchangedMj
(j , i).
The above actions are expressed by the operator In .i (i-th trans-
ducer congruence of order n), which is defined in terms of IProvn and
EProvn .j .
Fig. 3 summarizes the definition of location injections and elimi-
nation, labelling injection and projections, and transducer congru-
ences. We will refer to these operations, collectively, by the name
of provenance combinators.
3.4 Semantics
We now use the notions introduced in the previous sections to
formally define a provenance-aware small-step semantics: its rules
are shown in Fig. 4.
The reduction judgment F ⊢ M T↪−→ N of provenance-aware
semantics involves a provenance transducer T , which has type
Transτ for some τ , and relates the provenance of M to that of
N . As anticipated, some of the reduction rules make use of the
relocation operator ρ (. . .): to understand why, it is sufficient to see
that a transducer ultimately needs to translate every location in
the reduct into a location in the redex. Sometimes this translation
can be expressed as an elementary program: for instance, when
reducing a pair projection
fst ⟨R, S⟩ ↪→ R
a location ℓ for R corresponds to 1 # 1 # ℓ in fst ⟨R, S⟩. However,
for reduction rules involving substitutions, the correspondence is
not so simple. In the case of a function application reduction
( f (x ).M ) N ↪→ M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]
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Location injection: Loc ⊃ Loc
ILocn .i := λℓ. i # ℓ (n is irrelevant)
Location elimination: (Loc ⊃ τ ) ⊃ · · · ⊃ (Loc ⊃ τ ) ⊃ τ ⊃ Loc ⊃ τ
ELocn := λp1, . . . ,pn ,a, ℓ. case ℓ of {ϵ 7→ a; 1 # ℓ′ 7→ p1 ℓ′; . . . ;n # ℓ′ 7→ pn ℓ′}
Provenance injection: Provτ ⊃ · · · ⊃ Provτ ⊃ ∼τ ⊃ Provτ
IProvn := ELocn
Provenance projection: Provτ ⊃ Provτ
EProvn .i := λp. p ◦ ILocn .i
Transducer congruence: Transτ ⊃ Transτ
In .i := λt ,p. I
Prov
n (E
Prov
n .1 p) · · · (EProvn .(i−1) p) (t (EProvn .i p)) (EProvn .(i+1) p) · · · (EProvn .n p) (p ϵ )
Figure 3. Definition of the provenance combinators
the only way to map locations in the reduct to locations in the redex
is by means of a structural analysis of the expressions involved in
the reduction, which is not allowed by standard language constructs.
We thus extend the language with relocation expressions ρ (−→x .M )
which allow us to map redex locations to unreduced locations by
essentially “undoing” the substitution.
Relocation operations are functions with type Loc ⊃ Loc: when
ρ (−→xn .M ) is applied to a location ℓ in locs
(
M
[−→
Nn
/−→xn ]) , it first
computes the lookupM ℓ : if the lookup yields xi , ℓ′, for i = 1, . . . ,n
– i.e. one of the variables declared by the relocation, together with an
unconsumed location – ℓ′ represents the path to the subexpression
of Ni which corresponds to location ℓ in the substituted expression;
in this case, the relocation maps ℓ to i # ℓ′. If instead the lookup
M ℓ returns another subterm ofM together with ϵ , the relocation
maps ℓ to (n + 1) # ℓ; in all the other cases, ℓ is an invalid location
forM
[−→
Nn
/−→xn ] , and we return a (meaningless) default location ϵ .
Thanks to relocations, we canmap the locations of a beta-reduced
expression back to the original function application. For instance,
if ℓ ∈ locs(M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]), ρ ( f ,x .M ) ℓ will reduce to one
among 1 # ℓ1 (where ℓ1 ∈ locs( f (x ).M )), 2 # ℓ2 (where ℓ2 ∈ locs(N ),
or 3 # ℓ3 (where ℓ3 ∈ locs(M )). Mapping these locations to loca-
tions in locs(( f (x ).M ) N ) is then a matter of a simple case analysis,
which we provide as a relocation helper β (with type (Loc ⊃ Loc) ⊃
Loc ⊃ Loc):
β := λr , ℓ.case r ℓ of {3 # ℓ3 7→ 1 # 1 # ℓ3; _ 7→ ℓ}
Then for all N , the expression β ρ ( f ,x .M ) maps locations in
locs(M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]) to locations in locs(( f (x ).M ) N ).
Non-recursive function applications (λx .M ) N ↪→ M[x 7→ N ]
are a special case of recursive functions, thus the same operator
can be used to express their relocation function as well.
The view F is, in essence, a collection of basic transducers that
correspond to the basic reduction rules. This is especially clear in
the rules for the contraction of pair projections and the simpler
forms of case reductions, which simply return the transducers Ffst,
Fsnd, F•, Fϵ , Ftt, and Fff. The reduction of primitive operations is
similar, save for the fact that we allow a transducer F⊕ to receive
the actual arguments of ⊕ as parameters; furthermore, notice that
primitive operations only reduce when applied to values.
The rule for function application must express the propaga-
tion of provenance under substitution; this requires us to pro-
duce a transducer capable of mapping locations in the substitution
M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x] back to their label in the unreduced application
( f (x ).M ) N . To accomplish this task, Fβ will receive the reloca-
tion function β ρ ( f ,x .M ) as a parameter. Case analysis can reduce
to substituted expressions as well, which explains why F∼ and F#
receive relocations β∼ ρ (x .N ) and β# ρ (h, t .N ) as parameters; the
concrete definition of β∼ and β# should not be too surprising:
β∼ := λr , ℓ.case r ℓ of
{1 # ℓ1 7→ 1 # 1 # ℓ1; 2 # ℓ2 7→ 3 # ℓ2; _ 7→ ℓ}
β# := λr , ℓ.case r ℓ of
{1 # ℓ1 7→ 1 # 1 # ℓ1; 2 # ℓ2 7→ 1 # 2 # ℓ2; _ 7→ ℓ}
(notice that in β∼ the last branch of the case analysis can only be
reached when ℓ is ϵ or an invalid location).
Finally, three rules define the computational behaviour of the re-
locator ρ. The first rule applies to locations ℓ that, withinM
[−→
Nn
/−→xn ] ,
reference a proper subterm ofM that is not one of the substituted
variables: this is converted to the location (n + 1) # ℓ. The second
relocation reduction rule explains what to do when the lookup of
location ℓ within M references the i-th substituted variable, pos-
sibly with an unconsumed ℓ′ (which is a right-hand sublist of the
original ℓ): the reduced expression is ℓ′, prepended by the natural
number i . Finally, the third rule provides the evaluation of a relo-
cation applied to an invalid location: this situation is meaningless,
but we reduce to ϵ , with no special meaning other than it being a
canonical location.
Since relocations are employed to extract the provenance of
an expression, rather than expressions whose provenance must
be extracted, for both reduction rules involving ρ we provide a
forgetful transducer λ_.⊥.
Congruence rules use the transducer congruences from Fig. 3.
The generic form of a congruence is that of an n-ary composite ex-
pression k (M1, . . . ,Mi , . . . ,Mn ), which reduces to
k (M1, . . . ,M ′i , . . . ,Mn ) wheneverMi reduces toM ′i . Given a trans-
ducer T fromMi toM ′i we can obtain the congruence transducer
by means of the combinator In .i .
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Reduction rules
F ⊢ ( f (x ).M ) N Fβ (β ρ (f ,x .M ))↪−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x] F ⊢ ⊕(−→Vn ) F⊕ −→Vn↪−−−−→ ⊕ˆ(−→Vn )
F ⊢ fst(⟨M,N ⟩) Ffst↪−−−→ M F ⊢ snd(⟨M,N ⟩) Fsnd↪−−−→ N
(tt 7→ N ) ∈m
F ⊢ case ff ofm Ftt↪−−→ N
(ff 7→ N ) ∈m
F ⊢ case ff ofm Fff↪−−→ N
(• 7→ N ) ∈m
F ⊢ case • ofm F•↪−→ N
(∼x 7→ N ) ∈m
F ⊢ case ∼M ofm F∼ (β∼ ρ (x .N ))↪−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ N [M /x]
(ϵ 7→ N ) ∈m
F ⊢ case ϵ ofm Fϵ↪−→ N
(h # t 7→ N ) ∈m
F ⊢ caseM1 # M2 ofm
F# (β# ρ (h,t .N ))
↪−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ N [M1,M2/h, t]
M ℓ = M ′, ϵ M ′ < −→xn
F ⊢ ρ (−→xn .M ) ℓ λ_.⊥↪−−−−→ (n + 1) # ℓ
M ℓ = xi , ℓ′ 1 ≤ i ≤ n
F ⊢ ρ (−→xn .M ) ℓ λ_.⊥↪−−−−→ i # ℓ′
M ℓ = N , ℓ′ ℓ′ , ϵ for all i s.t. 1 ≤ i ≤ n : N , xi
F ⊢ ρ (−→xn .M ) ℓ λ_.⊥↪−−−−→ ϵ
Congruence rules
F ⊢ Mi T↪−→ M ′i
F ⊢ ⊕(−→Mn )
In .i T
↪−−−−−→ ⊕(M1, . . . ,M ′i , . . . ,Mn )
F ⊢ M T↪−→ M ′
F ⊢ M N I2.1 T↪−−−−→ M ′ N
F ⊢ N T↪−→ N ′
F ⊢ M N I2.2 T↪−−−−→ M N ′
F ⊢ M T↪−→ M ′
F ⊢ ⟨M,N ⟩ I2.1 T↪−−−−→ ⟨M ′,N ⟩
F ⊢ N T↪−→ N ′
F ⊢ ⟨M,N ⟩ I2.2 T↪−−−−→ ⟨M,N ′⟩
F ⊢ M T↪−→ M ′
F ⊢ fst(M ) I1.1 T↪−−−−→ fst(M ′)
F ⊢ M T↪−→ M ′
F ⊢ snd(M ) I1.1 T↪−−−−→ snd(M ′)
F ⊢ M T↪−→ M ′
F ⊢ caseM ofm I3.1 T↪−−−−→ caseM ′ ofm
Figure 4. Provenance-carrying semantics
3.5 Type system
The type system of PIC (Fig. 5) is defined in a standard way. Aside
from mentioning that it is parametric on the signature Σ used to
type constants and primitive operations, the only rule that deserves
to be mentioned here is the one concerning relocations. Relocations,
which are functions from Loc to Loc, are well typed provided that
their argument is well-typed in a properly extended context.
Even though provenance views as such are not PIC-expressions,
they are used in reductions andmust be well-typed to function prop-
erly. To typecheck a view, we use an auxiliary definition Tσ (Fig. 6):
each of the transducers Fκ within a view F must have type Tσ (κ),
where σ is a type of provenance labels and κ identifies one of the
basic reduction rules. Each Tσ (κ) returns a provenance transducer
of type Transσ , which may be parametrized by a relocation (for
κ = β ,∼, #) or by the actual arguments of the primitive operation
being reduced (for κ = ⊕).
Type-safety for PIC follows immediately.
Theorem 3.1 (Preservation and progress).
1. If Γ ⊢ M : σ , Γ ⊢ F : Tτ , and F ⊢ M T↪−→ M ′, then Γ ⊢ M ′ : σ
and Γ ⊢ T : Transτ .
2. If ⊢ M : σ andM is not a value, then for all F ,τ s.t. ⊢ F : Tτ ,
there exist T ,M ′ such that F ⊢ M T↪−→ M ′.
4 Provenance views
The provenance-carrying semantics we defined allows us to choose
a view F with great flexibility. Consider for example the reduction:
F ⊢ fst(⟨M,N ⟩) Ffst↪−−−→ M
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Expression typing
c : τ ∈ Σ
Γ ⊢ c : τ
x : τ ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ x : τ
Γ ⊢ −→M : −→σ ⊕ : −→σ ⊃ τ ∈ Σ
Γ ⊢ ⊕(−→M ) : τ
Γ,−→x : −→σ ⊢ M : τ
Γ ⊢ ρ (−→x .M ) : Loc ⊃ Loc
Γ ⊢ M : σ Γ ⊢ N : τ
Γ ⊢ ⟨M,N ⟩ : σ × τ
Γ ⊢ M : σ × τ
Γ ⊢ fst(M ) : σ
Γ ⊢ M : σ × τ
Γ ⊢ snd(M ) : τ
Γ, f : σ ⊃ τ ,x : σ ⊢ M : τ
Γ ⊢ f (x ).M : σ ⊃ τ
Γ ⊢ M : σ ⊃ τ Γ ⊢ N : σ
Γ ⊢ M N : τ
Γ ⊢ M : B Γ ⊢ N : τ Γ ⊢ R : τ
Γ ⊢ caseM of {tt 7→ N ; ff 7→ R} : τ
Γ ⊢ • : ∼σ
Γ ⊢ M : σ
Γ ⊢ ∼M : ∼σ
Γ ⊢ M : ∼σ Γ ⊢ N : τ Γ,x : σ ⊢ R : τ
Γ ⊢ caseM of {• 7→ N ;∼x 7→ R} : τ
Γ ⊢ ϵ : [σ ]
Γ ⊢ M : σ Γ ⊢ N : [σ ]
Γ ⊢ M # N : [σ ]
Γ ⊢ M : [σ ] Γ ⊢ N : τ Γ,h : σ , t : [σ ] ⊢ R : τ
Γ ⊢ caseM of {ϵ 7→ N ;h # t 7→ R} : τ
Provenance view typing
for all κ: Γ ⊢ Fκ : Tσ (κ)
Γ ⊢ F : Tσ
Figure 5. Typing rules
Tσ (β ) = (Loc ⊃ Loc) ⊃ Transσ
Tσ (∼) = (Loc ⊃ Loc) ⊃ Transσ
Tσ (#) = (Loc ⊃ Loc) ⊃ Transσ
Tσ (⊕) = −→τ ⊃ Transσ (if ⊕ : −→τ ⊃ τ ′ ∈ Σ)
Tσ (_) = Transσ
Figure 6. The type of views
Here, the transducer Ffst is allowed to transform the input labelling
without any restriction: the most obvious choice would be to prop-
agate the labels of the first element of the source pair, but other
choices are possible. F could erase all labels, or add a static label to
arbitrary subterms ofM ; it could even provide a new labelling ofM
using labels taken from N , even though N is not part of the reduced
term. The only limitation is that Ffst be a transducer expressible
as a language function.
The generality with which provenance views can be defined
is one of the strengths of our approach, but it comes at a cost:
views will usually be defined by pattern matching on locations,
and the transducers for function applications and case analysis
will often have to use a relocation function explicitly, which is
rather cumbersome. For many of the notions of provenance we are
interested in, such a generality is not needed and is only an element
of confusion.
Consider, for example, a fst-projection labelled with three dis-
tinguished provenance annotations in the form fst(⟨M a˜1 ,N ⟩a˜2 )a˜3
(for better readability, we represent provenance annotations as su-
perscripts, rather than providing an explicit function expression
from locations to annotations). When reducing the projection, we
might want the outermost label of the reducedM to depend only
on those a˜i (ignoring the annotations of N ) and the inner subex-
pressions of M to keep the same labels that they had before the
reduction. In other words, we would like the labelling to be trans-
formed as follows:
fst(⟨M a˜1 ,N ⟩a˜2 )a˜3 { Mvfst a˜3 a˜1 a˜2
where vfst is some expression with type ∼τ ⊃ ∼τ ⊃ ∼τ ⊃ ∼τ , for
an annotation type ∼τ .
Similarly, when reducing (( f (x ).M a˜1 )a˜2 N a˜3 )a˜4 , we often expect
the reduced term to be, essentially,M a˜1 where free occurrences of f
and x have been replaced by ( f (x ).M a˜1 )a˜2 and N a˜3 ; the outermost
label of the reduced term could additionally depend on a˜2 and a˜4
(which annotate AST nodes that are destroyed by the reduction). A
transducer Fβ satisfying these conditions could be defined as:
λr ,p, ℓ. case ℓ of {ϵ 7→ vβ (p ϵ ) (p [1]) (p (r ϵ )); _ 7→ p (r ℓ)}
wherevβ is an arbitrary term combining three annotations into one,
(p ϵ ) and (p [1]) return the annotations corresponding to a˜4 and a˜2
in the example. The argument r receives a relocation function in the
form β ρ ( f ,x .M ), provided by the standard provenance-carrying
semantics, which is used to retrieve the “natural” annotation arising
from the substitution of a labelled term into another labelled term.
These examples show that while manipulating raw provenance
labellings is tricky, we can keep things simple by providing func-
tions like vfst and vβ , which combine a few distinguished annota-
tions and propagate all the others.
Based on this considerations, we provide the following lifting
framework that lifts functions vκ on provenance annotations to the
corresponding provenance transducers Fκ :
Fβ (vβ ) := λr ,p, ℓ. case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ vβ (p ϵ ) (p [1]) (p (r ϵ )); _ 7→ p (r ℓ)}
Ffst (vfst) := λp, ℓ. case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ vfst (p ϵ ) (p [1]) (p [1; 1]); _ 7→ p (1 # 1 # ℓ)}
Fsnd (vsnd) := λp, ℓ. case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ vsnd (p ϵ ) (p [1]) (p [1; 2]); _ 7→ p (1 # 2 # ℓ)}
Ftt (vtt) := λp, ℓ. case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ vtt (p ϵ ) (p [1]) (p [2]); _ 7→ p (2 # ℓ)}
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Fff (vff) := λp, ℓ. case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ vtt (p ϵ ) (p [1]) (p [3]); _ 7→ p (3 # ℓ)}
F• (v•) := λp, ℓ. case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ v• (p ϵ ) (p [1]) (p [2]); _ 7→ p (2 # ℓ)}
F∼ (v∼) := λr ,p, ℓ. case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ v∼ (p ϵ ) (p [1]) (p (r ϵ )); _ 7→ p (r ℓ)}
Fϵ (vϵ ) := λp, ℓ. case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ vϵ (p ϵ ) (p [1]) (p [2]); _ 7→ p (2 # ℓ)}
F# (v#) := λr ,p, ℓ. case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ v# (p ϵ ) (p [1]) (p (r ϵ )); _ 7→ p (r ℓ)}
F⊕ (v⊕ ) := λ−→xn ,p, ℓ. case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ v⊕ −→xn (p ϵ ) (p [1]) (p [2]) · · · (p [n])
; _ 7→ ϵ }
F (v ) := ⟨Fβ (vβ ), . . . , F⊕ (v⊕ )⟩
4.1 Where-provenance
Using the lifting framework, we define a where-provenance view
W by means of label-propagating transducers. The view can use
any optional type of labels ∼τ .
When a reduction copies certain data, the corresponding trans-
ducer will propagate the provenance annotations along with the
data; when a reduction transforms the term beyond recognizability
(for example, when reducing primitive operations), there is no label
to propagate, therefore the corresponding transducer will produce
the default, uninformative label •.
w⊕ := λ−→xn , a˜,−→˜an .•
wκ := λ_, _, a˜.a˜ (κ , ⊕)
W := F (w )
Example 4.1. Let f := λx ,y.case x ?=y of {tt 7→ x ; ff 7→ y + 1}.
We map f 2 to a list [1; 2; 3]:
map ( f 2)[1; 2; 3]
∗
↪→ [2; 2; 4]
Now consider the following provenance labelling L assigning an-
notations a˜, a˜1, a˜2, a˜3 as follows:
map ( f 2a˜ ) [1a˜1 ; 2a˜2 ; 3a˜3 ]
(subexpressions without an annotation are considered to labelled
by •). A where-provenance reduction acts as follows:
map ( f 2a˜ ) [1a˜1 ; 2a˜2 ; 3a˜3 ]
∗
↪→ [2; 2a˜ ; 4]
In the output list, only the second element is annotated with a,
meaning that it was copied from the argument of f ; the other two
elements were not copied, but obtained by incrementing previous
values in the same position, and thus receive the • annotation.
As a general rule, after each execution step we expect subex-
pressions labelled with ∼a to be copied from parts of the original
expression having the same label. The actual well-behavedness
property of where-provenance, in our setting, is less naïve than
that: consider the reduction
(λx .(λy.(x y)a )) N ↪→ λy.(N y)a
The subexpression (N y) is indeed derived from the similarly la-
belled (x y), but the two are only equal up to the substitution [N /x].
The relation between the two expressions can be made formal:
Definition 4.2. M ⊑ N ⇐⇒ ∃s .M[s] ∗↪→ N , where s is a substi-
tution.
Lemma 4.3.
1. ⊑ is an order relation;
2. ifM ⊑ N and N ∗↪→ R, thenM ⊑ R.
We can then prove thatW satisfies the followingwell-behavedness
property of where-provenance:
Theorem 4.4 (well-behavedness ofW ). SupposeW ⊢ M T↪−→ N :
then for all labellings L and ℓ ∈ locs(N ), if T L ℓ { ∼a, there exists
ℓ′ ∈ locs(M ) such that L ℓ′ { ∼a andM ℓ′ ⊑ N ℓ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation ofW ⊢ M T↪−→ N . See appen-
dix. □
Notice that for the big-step provenance extraction framework, a
simpler well-behavedness property is stated, thanks to the fact that
only closed expressions can be annotated, and substitution has no
effect on closed expressions.
4.2 Expression provenance
To define expression provenance, we allow provenance labels to
be simplified syntax trees with constants or primitive annotations
as leaves and primitive operation symbols as inner nodes. More
formally, we assume a type of labels τ containing the following
elements:
a ::= b¯ | kc | k⊕ (−→an )
where b belongs to a type of basic annotations τb , and kc and k⊕ ,
defined for all constants c and all n-ary basic operations ⊕, are
reified representations of language expressions. As usual, τ will be
wrapped in an optional type ∼τ .
Accordingly, a numeric value, say 2, could have several possible
labels: a label ∼b¯ means that 2 was copied from a part of the input
with the same label; a label ∼k+ (a1,a2) means it was obtained by
adding together two values originally labelled with ∼a1 and ∼a2;
the label •, as usual, provides no information; finally the label ∼k2,
merely indicates a literal 2, but does not specify its provenance
otherwise, therefore it can be considered a variant of •.
The expression provenance view can be defined by means of a
simple variation on where-provenance. The only transducer that
needs a different definition, unsurprisingly, is the one associated
with the evaluation of primitive operations (e⊕):
e⊕ := λ−→xn , a˜,−→˜an .k⊕ (−−−−−→a˜n ∗ xn )
eκ := λ_, _, a˜.a˜ (κ , ⊕)
E := F (e )
In the definition, we use the following ∗ operation:
(a˜) ∗ x =
{ ∼kx if a˜ = •
a˜ else
where kx is the label corresponding to the constant x (remember
that primitive operations are reduced when applied to constants,
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thus we must have x = c for some c). This allows us to conjure an
informative annotation for constants that have not been given a
provenance.
Example 4.5. We start with the same labelling as in the where-
provenance example:
map ( f 2a˜ ) [1a˜1 ; 2a˜2 ; 3a˜3 ]
If we evaluate the term according to expression provenance, we
obtain the following labelled value:
[2k+ (a˜1,k1 ) ; 2a˜ ; 4k+ (a˜3,k1 )]
Just like in where-provenance, 2a˜ indicates a term that was copied
from the input; the term 2k+ (a˜1,k1 ) , instead, has been obtained by
adding together 1a˜1 and an unannotated literal 1.
The well-behavedness property for expression provenance views
states, informally, that annotations can be used to recompute the
annotated expression. To make this formal, let us consider meta-
language functions h mapping basic annotation values in τb to
arbitrary language values. We then define the extension of such
an h to full annotations as the metalanguage function hˆ mapping
values in τ to arbitrary language values, as follows:
hˆ(b¯) = h(b)
hˆ(kc ) = c
hˆ(k⊕ (a˜1, . . . , a˜n )) = ⊕ˆ(hˆ(a˜1), . . . , hˆ(a˜n ))
We then introduce consistent mappings (a modified version of
the analogous concept used in [1]) as those functions h which agree
with a certain annotated expression.
Definition 4.6. LetM be a term, and L a provenance labelling for
M of type Loc ⊃ ∼τ . We say that h is a consistent mapping for L ▷ M
(and writeh ⊩ L ▷ M) if and only if for all ℓ ∈ locs(M ) there exist an
annotation a˜ such that L ℓ { a˜ and, if a˜ = ∼a′, then hˆ(a′) ⊑ M ℓ .
Finally, we prove that reduction under the view E preserves
consistent mappings.
Theorem 4.7 (well-behavedness of E). If h ⊩ L ▷ M and E ⊢ M T↪−→
N , then h ⊩ T L ▷ N .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of E ⊢ M T↪−→ N . See the
appendix. □
4.3 Dependency provenance
Dependency provenance associates to each expression location an
annotation containing a set of labels. A full definition of dependency
provenance would therefore require us to encode sets as a type
of the language, providing at the same time an implementation of
standard set operations. We could for example use the list encoding
of sets, which is a simple programming exercise; for the purposes of
this paper, we will abstract from the actual definition of the type of
dependency annotations, assuming that a sound implementation of
set operations like union and membership test exists. In particular,
we assume that the default annotation • be interpreted as the empty
set of labels ∅ rather than the “none” optional value.
The dependency view then merely amounts to taking the union
of all the dependency sets involved in a reduction:
d⊕ := λ−→xn ,−−−→a˜n+1.
⋃−−−→
a˜n+1
dκ := λa˜1, a˜2, a˜3.a˜1 ∪ a˜2 ∪ a˜3 (κ , ⊕)
D := F (d )
Example 4.8. We adapt our example to dependency provenance
by extending the language of provenance labels to accept sets of
annotations:
map ⟨f 2{a }, [1{a1 } ; 2{a2 } ; 3{a3 }]⟩
(where subexpressions without an annotation are considered to
labelled by ∅). After evaluation, we get the following dependency
provenance labelling:
[2{a1,a } ; 2{a2,a } ; 4{a3,a }]
The new labelling reflects the fact that each element of the list
depends from both the corresponding element in the source list,
and the argument to the function f .
To state the well-behavedness property for the view D we use
a relation L ▷ M ≈a L′ ▷ M ′ that holds when the annotated terms
L ▷ M and L′ ▷ M ′ are quasi-equal, up to subterms annotated with
a label a (e.g. ⟨1, 2S⟩ ≈a ⟨1, 3S′⟩ provided that a ∈ S ∩ S′). The
idea is that, if starting with L ▷ M we perform a reduction step
D ⊢ M T↪−→ N whose redex is entirely guarded by the label a, we
obtain a term that is still quasi-equal to L′ ▷ M ′. If instead the redex
is not guarded by a, then we can find a reduction D ⊢ M ′ T
′
↪−→ N ′
such that T L ▷ N ≈a T ′ L′ ▷ N ′.
To indicate reductions guarded and not guarded by an annotation,
we use the notation:
D ⊢ (L ▷ M ) T↪−→a N
D ⊢ (L ▷ M ) T↪−→a¯ N
(a formal definition is given in the appendix).
Theorem 4.9 (well-behavedness of D). Suppose L ▷ M ≈a L′ ▷ M ′.
Then:
1. If D ⊢ (L ▷ M ) T↪−→a N , we have T L ▷ N ≈a L′ ▷ M ′.
2. If D ⊢ (L ▷ M ) T↪−→a¯ N , there exist T ′, N ′ such that D ⊢
M ′ T
′
↪−→ N ′ and T L ▷ N ≈a T ′ L′. ▷ N ′.
Proof. By structural induction on the definition of quasi-equality,
followed by case analysis on the last rule of the reduction derivation.
See appendix. □
Admittedly, this property is weaker than the dependency-correctness
of [9], as we do not consider redexes that are partially guarded
by a, such as ( f (x ).M ) {a } N . We believe that full dependency-
correctness also holds, but cannot be proved without resorting to a
more complex argument involving well-typedness; we thus leave
this proof as future work.
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Expressions L,M,N ::= . . . | ι (F ,L ▷ M )
Views F ::= ⟨Mβ ,Mfst,Msnd,M•,M∼,
Mϵ ,M#,M⊕,Mι ⟩
locs(ι (F ,L ▷ M )) = {ϵ }
G ⊢ M T↪−→ N
F ⊢ ι (G,L ▷ M ) I↪−→ ι (G,T L ▷ N )
FV(V ) = ∅
F ⊢ ι (G,L ▷ V ) Fι↪−→ ⟨V ,L⟩
Γ ⊢ F : Tσ Γ ⊢ L : Provσ Γ ⊢ M : τ
Γ ⊢ ι (F ,L ▷ M ) : τ × Provσ
Tσ (ι) = Transσ
F (vι ) = λp, ℓ.case ℓ of {ϵ 7→ vι (p ϵ ); _ 7→ •}
Figure 7. Syntax, semantics, and typing of inspection
5 Self-inspection
The language described in Section 3, together with the view defini-
tion framework of Section 4, can be compared to TML. Although we
have simplified the type system by renouncing to recursive types,
the two languages are quite similar; the provenance extraction
framework can also be compared to our view definition framework.
Our approach, however, does provide a few enhancements:
• our small-step semantics is not limited to call-by-value eval-
uation, like their big-step definition, but accomodates a
variety of evaluation strategies;
• provenance views and provenance data are expressed in the
same language as the programs whose provenance is being
considered;
• in our language, we need not take the extra step of materi-
alizing the execution trace of a program before extracting
its provenance;
• as a consequence, to compute the provenance of a program
we do not have to replay its execution trace.
The most important reason why these features matter is that
they make it possible for our language to be extended with an
introspective inspection operation, which we will denote by the
following syntax:
ι (F ,LM ▷ M )
The intended semantics of inspections, informally, is that M will
be evaluated to V ; at the same time, the provenance view F will be
applied to LM to obtain a new labelling LV for V ; finally, evalua-
tion will produce the pair ⟨V ,LV ⟩, making both the value and its
provenance available for the rest of the program.
Provenance inspection is introduced by means of the extension
described in Figure 7. From the point of view of location lookup,
inspections are treated like opaque boxes: the locs operation only
returns the singleton {ϵ } when applied to an inspection, so access
to its syntactic subterms is not allowed.
The typing rule checks that the type of the provenance view
F agree with that of the provenance labelling L; the term under
inspection can be of any type.
Two different reduction rules are applied depending on whether
the term under inspection has been fully evaluated or not. When
the term M under inspection is not a value, it can be reduced to
N , by means of the first reduction rule, using the viewG specified
by the inspection; this returns a transducer T that we apply to the
initial provenance labelling L to obtain a new labelling T L suitable
for N .
When, after a certain number n of reduction steps, the inspected
term becomes a value V , with a certain provenance
L′ = Tn (Tn−1 · · · (T0 L) · · · ); then the inspection can be concluded
by a final step, using the second rule, which merely returns the
value V together with its labelling L′. The premise requiring that
V should be a closed term is needed because free variables might
be replaced by any expression, including expressions containing
redexes, and in such a case the inspection should continue; however,
since we do not allow reduction inside binders, this check is only
necessary if we are interested in evaluating open terms.
Unlike TML, the syntax of PIC allows free nesting of provenance
inspections. For this reason we also need to explain what an ex-
ternal observer can see when an inspection is performed. Here we
need to make a choice and decide whether inner reductions can be
observed or not. Since inspections come with a local provenance
labelling, they cannot be easily reconciled with a non-local prove-
nance view; then the simplest policy, which we adopt, is to make
inner reductions not observable: this is obtained by returning the
identity I = λx .x as the transducer for inner reductions. The final
inspection step, instead, can be observed: it employs the transducer
Fι , which is defined in the outer view F .
The presence of nested inspections clearly has implications for
privacy and confidentiality: on one hand, inner inspections decide
whether to share provenance information with external observers,
and to what extent; on the other hand, the external observer is
aware of hidden computations thanks to the transducer Fι .
This interaction is not unexpected: implications of provenance
for confidentiality, privacy, availability, and other security proper-
ties have been investigated by some previous work ([5, 8, 12, 16]).
Wewill now elaborate further by considering an example of security
application.
5.1 Example: inspection of dynamically linked programs
In the previous sections we have discussed provenance as a property
of data, and how it evolves during the execution of a program, but
we have not provided concrete examples of how provenance can
be used in a concrete setting.
We will here provide a demonstration of how provenance can
be used to detect possible security issues. Our example considers
dynamic linking, a technique widely available in modern operat-
ing systems, which allows the linking of object code from several
sources to happen at load time (or in certain cases at run time),
rather than compile time. When an executable file is built from
source code containing references to functions defined in a shared
(or dynamic-link) library, those references remain unresolved; in-
stead, special directives are added to the executable file header,
including a record of the required library functions (sometimes
called import table). When loading the executable file, the operating
system is expected to find the required shared libraries and load
them into memory beside the program code, and link the two by
resolving the function references declared in the import table.
Dynamic linking allows a system to avoid duplication of fre-
quently used code, both on disk and in RAM (when two processes
using the same library are running concurrently, the memory image
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of the library can be shared across the two addressing spaces by
means of paging). While 30 years ago programs usually employed
less than 5 dynamic-link libraries, today’s software systems can
require several dozens or even hundreds of libraries provided by dif-
ferent developers. Libraries from trusted sources may coexist with
libraries from untrusted sources, and they may use each other’s
services.
To model a simple dynamic linker, we assume a type [N] ⊃ N
for shared library functions – an acceptable assumption, given that
executable file formats often enforce a loose or trivial typing disci-
pline for these functions. A store of type [id × ([N] ⊃ N)] associates
function identifiers to the corresponding shared function.
A program comprises executable code, which we model as a
function of type [[N] ⊃ N] ⊃ [N] ⊃ N, and an import table, which
in our setting is simply a list of identifiers of shared functions that
should be loaded. The code receives as its first parameter a list of
concrete functions matching the imported identifiers from import
table, while the second argument must be a list of input parameters
for the program; at the end, a natural number is returned.
The goal of the dynamic linker is to serve the list of imported
functions to the program code. If the store and the import table
are both ordered by increasing values of identifiers, this can be
achieved by the following procedure:
dynalink := λstore, code, imptab.
let imps := filter_map (λ⟨x , f ⟩.x ∈ imptab) (λ⟨x , f ⟩. f ) store
in code imps
where filter_map p f l ignores the elements of the list l that do
not satisfy the predicate p, but is otherwise the same as map f l .
We now consider a toy program whose purpose is to store pass-
words to permanent memory. The program employs salt and a hash
function to make dictionary attacks unfeasible in case a malicious
agent gained access to the password file:
savepw :=λimps,pw .
let salt := $RND [] in
$WRITE [salt];
$WRITE [$HASH [(salt∥pw)]]
where the semi-colon is a binary operator on natural numbers sim-
ply returning the second argument, and ∥ combines two natural
numbers into one, for example by concatenating their bit represen-
tations, or by means of Cantor’s encoding of pairs. HASH, RND, and
WRITE are identifiers for three imported functions: the import table
for savepw is thus the following:
[HASH; RND; WRITE]
Finally, we write $ID as syntactic sugar for an imported function
call; concretely, this involves a lookup by ordinal number in the
import list imps: e.g $WRITE = nth imps 2 (where nth returns the
element of a list referred to by a zero-based index).
Suppose that we do not have access to the source code of savepw:
we can still read its import table and see that the program requires
the use of a cryptographic hash function, a random number genera-
tor, and persistent storage. This is not suspicious, but for increased
trust we may want to inspect the operation of savepw and verify
that only a properly encrypted password has been stored.
For this purpose, we use the following provenance label type:
∼label ::= • | ∼private | ∼random | ∼rndpriv | ∼breach
| ∼standard | ∼unsafe | ∼oneway
The first four labels are used to express the provenance of data:
the default • labels data that is public or irrelevant as far as con-
fidentiality goes; data labelled by ∼private, on the contrary, is
confidential; ∼random is used for non-private data coming from
a random source; finally, ∼rndpriv labels data containing both
private and random information. A label ∼breach, also used to
annotate data, is only generated when a potential security breach
is detected.
The last three labels are used to annotate functions:
• ∼standard is used for pure functions that manipulate the
input in an unknown way; they can throw away part of the
input, but may not create private data out of thin air: since
the randomized part of the input may not be preserved, this
label combines with labelled data as follows
∼standard(•) = •
∼standard(∼random) = •
∼standard(∼private) = ∼private
∼standard(∼rndpriv) = ∼private
∼standard(∼breach) = ∼breach
• ∼unsafe annotates functions that should not receive private
data, because they contain untrusted code with side effects
(e.g. writing to disk, sending data over a network, displaying
information on a terminal): it behaves as follows
∼unsafe(•) = •
∼unsafe(∼random) = •
∼unsafe(∼private) = ∼breach
∼unsafe(∼rndpriv) = ∼breach
∼unsafe(∼breach) = ∼breach
• ∼oneway is similar to standard but is used with functions
known to be one-way; thus when applied to randomized
private data, it produces non-confidential output:
∼oneway(•) = • ∼oneway(∼random) = •
∼oneway(∼private) = ∼private ∼oneway(∼rndpriv) = •
∼oneway(∼breach) = ∼breach
This annotation propagation policy can be implemented as a
provenance view S . The labelling Lstore for the shared library
functions will usually be fixed, and we assume that the concrete
functions hash, rnd, write are labelled by oneway, random, unsafe.
Given the password pw (which, for simplicity, will be a natural
number), we make it confidential by defining its labelling as
Lpw := λℓ.case ℓ of {ϵ 7→ ∼private; _ 7→ •}
As previously mentioned, an outer inspection cannot see what
happens within an inner one, so an additional task of S , besides
propagating annotations, is to flag inner inspections as possible
security breaches, by means of the transducer
Sι := λ_, _.breach
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Nowwe can apply the dynamic linker to savepw and try running
it by means of the syntax:
M = dynalink store savepw [HASH; RND; WRITE] pw
where the provenance labelling forM can be obtained by combining
Lstore, Lpw, and trivial labellings for all the other parts ofM :
L = IProv2 (I
Prov
2 (I
Prov
2 (I
Prov
2 ⊥ Lstore •) ⊥ •) ⊥ •) Lpw •
Finally, we perform an inspection:
ι (S,L ▷ M )
∗
↪→ ⟨0,L′⟩
where 0 is the value returned by the call to WRITE, and L′ ϵ ∗↪→
∼public confirms that no security breaches were detected.
6 Conclusions
The language PIC that we have described in this paper represents
provenance by means of labelling functions. This seems to be a nat-
ural approach in a calculus allowing provenance to be manipulated
as a first-class expression because in this way all the provenance
annotations for the same term are gathered in the same place. Other
approaches based on annotation propagation would scatter this
information across various subterms, and would thus require ad-
ditional effort to extract the provenance and separate it from the
term it describes.
Provenance as labelling functions also seems to have a relatively
elegant, albeit slightly low-level, theory of combinators, which
guides the definition of the provenance-aware semantics. Although
defining provenance views by combining annotations locally (as in
TML) is simpler than doing so by handling whole labellings (as re-
quired by our semantics), we have provided a simplified framework
to bridge this gap.
Although PIC is a pure functional language, we envision extend-
ing it with imperative constructs such as references and exceptions.
Experience in the related area of program slicing ([19]) tells us that
such an extension would not be straightforward, but might provide
a good starting point.
We have chosen to make provenance inspection local: an outer
inspection cannot observe the computation happening within an
inner inspection; this ensures a certain confidentiality of metadata,
which cannot be shared by accident with the public. However,
this is not the only possible way to handle nested inspections: a
transparent provenance inspection could also be defined using the
following evaluation rule:
G ⊢ M G[R]↪−−−−→ N
F ⊢ ι (G,L ▷ M ) I1.1 (F [R])↪−−−−−−−−−→ ι (G,T L ▷ N )
where R identifies the reduction rule used in the premise, and
F [R] returns the trasducer for rule R according to the view F : this
allows reduction within ι to be treated like any other congruence.
Apart from a slight notational complication, this extension appears
straightforward.
Another possibility, given ι (G,L ▷ M ) is to makeM invisible to
an external observer, but to allow an outer inspection to provide
a labelling for G and L. Indeed, since a provenance view contains
standard language functions, it needs not be statically determined:
it is perfectly admissible to receive provenance transducers as the
arguments of a program, and use them to construct a view to be
used in an inspection. In other words, views may have a non-trivial
provenance, which could provide a reason to inspect the provenance
of provenance. This concept appears not to be entirely new (see
e.g. [15, 17]); further investigation of relations between nested
inspections and provenance of provenance will be the subject of
future work.
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A Proofs
Lemma A.1. For all ℓ ∈ locs(R
[−→
Mn
/−→xn ] ) (where the xi are dis-
tinct), one of the following holds:
• Rℓ = xi , ℓ′ andR [−→Mn /−→xn ] ℓ = Mi ℓ′ , for some ℓ′ ∈ locs(Mi )
• Rℓ = R′, ϵ and R [−→Mn /−→xn ] ℓ = R′ [−→Mn /−→xn ] , ϵ , for some R′.
Proof. By structural induction on R, followed by a case analysis
on ℓ ∈ locs(R
[−→
Mn
/−→xn ] ). For the recursive cases, we only consider
functions, but the other cases are similar.
• R = xi
then ℓ ∈ locs(Mi ) and Rℓ = xi ℓ = x , ℓ. We complete the
proof by proving xi
[−→
Mn
/−→xn ] ℓ = Mi ℓ , which is trivial by
definition of substitution.
• R = y < −→xn
then ℓ ∈ locs(y), which implies ℓ = ϵ and Rℓ = yϵ = y, ϵ .
Finally, y
[−→
Mn
/−→xn ] ϵ = y [−→Mn /−→xn ] , ϵ , which completes the
proof.
• R = д(y).S , where д,y#−→xn ,−→Mn
then ℓ = ϵ or ℓ = 1.ℓ1, where ℓ1 ∈ locs(S
[−→
Mn
/−→xn ] ). In the
first case, we have д(y).S ϵ = д(y).S, ϵ and
(д(y).S )
[−→
M
/−→xn ] ϵ = (д(y).S ) [−→Mn /−→xn ] , ϵ , which proves
the thesis. In the other case, д(y).S 1.ℓ1 = S ℓ1 and
(д(y).S )
[−→
Mn
/−→xn ] 1.ℓ1 = S [−→Mn /−→xn ] ℓ1 , and the thesis fol-
lows by induction hypothesis.
□
LemmaA.2. For all ℓ ∈ locs(M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]), there exists ℓ′ ∈
locs( f (x ).M ) N such that β ρ ( f ,x .M ) ℓ ↪→ ℓ′ and ( f (x ).M ) N ℓ′ ⊑
M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]ℓ .
Proof. By cases onM ℓ , using Lemma A.1, we get three cases:
• M ℓ = f , ℓ1, M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]ℓ = f (x ).M ℓ1 , and
ℓ1 ∈ locs( f (x ).M ): we easily prove that β ρ ( f ,x .M ) ℓ ∗↪→ 1#
ℓ1 and ( f (x ).M ) N 1#ℓ1 = f (x ).M ℓ1 = M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]ℓ ,
thus a fortiori ( f (x ).M ) N 1#ℓ1 ⊑ M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]ℓ .
• M ℓ = x , ℓ1,M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]ℓ = N ℓ1 , and ℓ1 ∈ locs(N ):
we easily prove that β ρ ( f ,x .M ) ℓ
∗
↪→ 2 # ℓ1 and
( f (x ).M ) N 2#ℓ1 = N ℓ1 = M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]ℓ , thus a
fortiori ( f (x ).M ) N 2.ℓ1 ⊑ M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]ℓ .
• M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]ℓ = M ′ [f (x ).M,N / f ,x], ϵ andM ℓ =
M ′, ϵ : we easily prove that β ρ ( f ,x .M ) ℓ ∗↪→ 1 # 1 # ℓ,
( f (x ).M ) N 1.1.ℓ = M ′, ϵ , and M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]ℓ =
M ′ [f (x ).M,N / f ,x] , ϵ ; consequently M ′ ⊑
M ′ [f (x ).M,N / f ,x], which proves the thesis.
□
Lemma A.3. For all ℓ ∈ locs(N [M /x]), there exists
ℓ′ ∈ locs(case ∼M of m) such that β∼ ρ (x .N ) ℓ ∗↪→ ℓ′ and, if
∼x 7→ N ∈m, then case ∼M ofmℓ′ ⊑ N [M /x]ℓ .
For all ℓ ∈ locs(N [M1,M2/x ,y]), there exists
ℓ′ ∈ locs(caseM1 # M2) ofm) such that β# ρ (x .N ) ℓ ∗↪→ ℓ′ and, if
x # y 7→ N ∈m, then caseM1 # M2 ofmℓ′ ⊑ N [M1,M2/x ,y]ℓ .
Proof. Follows the same principle as Lemma A.2. □
Lemma A.4. Assume that for all ℓ1 ∈ locs(M ′) and for all J there
exists ℓ2 ∈ locs(M ) s.t. T J ℓ1 ∗↪→ J ℓ2 and M ℓ2 ⊑ M ′ℓ1 . Then for
all ℓ1 ∈ locs(M ′ N ) and for all J there exists ℓ2 ∈ locs(M N ) s.t.
I2.1 T J ℓ
′
1 { J ℓ
′
2 andM N
ℓ2 ⊑ M ′ N ℓ1 .
Lemma A.5. If h ⊩ L ▷ R S , then h ⊩ L ◦ ILoc2.1 ▷ R.
Proof of Theorem 4.4 Suppose W ⊢ M T↪−→ N : then for all la-
bellings L and ℓ ∈ locs(N ), if T L ℓ ∗↪→ ∼a, there exists ℓ′ such that
L ℓ′ { ∼a andM ℓ′ ⊑ N ℓ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation ofW ⊢ M T↪−→ N . We consider
only some of the rules, but the full proof can be obtained following
the same approach.
• W ⊢ ( f (x ).R) S Wβ (β ρ (f ,x .R ))↪−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ R [f (x ).R, S / f ,x]
we have
Wβ (β ρ ( f ,x .R)) J ℓ
∗
↪→
case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ wβ (J ϵ ) (J [1]) (J (β ρ ( f ,x .R) ϵ ))
; _ 7→ J (β ρ ( f ,x .R) ℓ)}
and by cases on ℓ we prove that this reduces to
J (β ρ ( f ,x .R) ℓ); by Lemma A.2 we obtain ℓ′ such that
J (β ρ ( f ,x .R) ℓ)
∗
↪→ J ℓ′ and ( f (x ).R) S ℓ′ ⊑
R [f (x ).R, S / f ,x]ℓ , which proves the thesis.
• W ⊢ ⊕(−→Vn ) W⊕
−→
Vn
↪−−−−−→ ⊕ˆ(−→Vn )
ℓ ∈ locs(⊕ˆ(−→Vn )) means ℓ = ϵ , thus we haveW⊕ −→Vn J ϵ ∗↪→
w⊕
−→
Vn (
−−→
J [i])i=1...n ) (J ϵ ). Since this term only reduces to
•, we have nothing to prove.
• W ⊢ fst(⟨R, S⟩) Wfst↪−−−→ R
by a simple case analysis on ℓwe obtainWfst J ℓ
∗
↪→ J (1#1#
ℓ); then we take ℓ′ = 1#1#ℓ and prove fst⟨R, S⟩1#1#ℓ = Rℓ ,
thus the thesis holds.
• W ⊢ case (R1 # R2) ofm
W# (β# ρ (x,y .S ))
↪−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S [R1,R2/x ,y],
where (x ,y 7→ S ) ∈m
by cases on ℓ we show W# (β# ρ (x ,y.S )) J ℓ
∗
↪→
J (β# ρ (x ,y.S )) ℓ); we use Lemma A.3 to obtain ℓ′ such
that β# ρ (x ,y.S ) ℓ
∗
↪→ ℓ′ and case (R1 # R2) ofmℓ′ ⊑
S [R1,R2
/
x ,y]ℓ , which proves the thesis.
• W ⊢ R S I2.1 T↪−−−−→ R′ S
assume by IH that for all J and all ℓ ∈ locs(R′) there exists
ℓ′ ∈ locs(R) s.t.T J ℓ ∗↪→ J ℓ′ andRℓ′ ⊑ R′ℓ . By LemmaA.4
we prove that for all J and all ℓ ∈ locs(R′ S ) there exists
ℓ′ ∈ locs(R S ) s.t. I2.1 T I ℓ
∗
↪→ ℓ′, R S ℓ′ ⊑ R′ S ℓ .
□
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Proof of Theorem 4.7 If h ⊩ L ▷ M and E ⊢ M T↪−→ N , then
h ⊩ T L ▷ N .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of E ⊢ M T↪−→
N . We consider only some of the rules, but the full proof can be
obtained following the same approach.
• E ⊢ ( f (x ).R) S Eβ β (f (x ).R,S )↪−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ R [f (x ).R, S / f ,x]
assume ℓ ∈ locs(R [f (x ).R, S / f ,x]): we have
Eβ (β ρ ( f ,x .R)) L ℓ
∗
↪→
case ℓ of
{ϵ 7→ eβ (L ϵ ) (L [1]) (L (β ρ ( f ,x .R)) ϵ )
; _ 7→ L (β ρ ( f ,x .R)) ℓ}
by cases on ℓ we prove that this reduces to L (β ρ ( f ,x .R) ℓ);
by Lemma A.2 we obtain ℓ′ such that L (β ρ ( f ,x .R) ℓ) {
L ℓ′ and ( f (x ).R) S ℓ′ ⊑ R [f (x ).R, S / f ,x]ℓ ; since by hy-
pothesis h is a consistent map for the function application,
we obtain V such that hˆ(V ) ⊑ ( f (x ).R) S ℓ′ ; by transitivity
of ⊑, we obtain hˆ(V ) ⊑ R [f (x ).R, S / f ,x]ℓ , which proves
the thesis.
• E ⊢ ⊕(−→Un ) E⊕
−→
Un
↪−−−−−→ ⊕ˆ(−→Un )
the only location in ⊕ˆ(−→Un ) is ϵ , so we have to find V such
that E⊕
−→
Un L ϵ
∗
↪→ V and hˆ(V ) ⊑ ⊕ˆ(−→Un ). We show that
E⊕
−→
Un L ϵ { k⊕ (
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(L [i]) ∗Ui )i=1...n and choose this as
V ; we also compute hˆ(V ) = hˆ(k⊕ (
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(L [i]) ∗Ui )i=1...n ) =
⊕(
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
hˆ((L [i]) ∗Ui )i=1...n ); for each i = 1 . . .n we prove
hˆ((L [i]) ∗Ui ) ⊑ Ui : in fact, the argument of the function
is either a symbol kUi representing Ui (which must be a
constant), and hˆ(kUi ) = Ui , or some value U ∗ such that
L [i] { U ∗, and this is enough to prove hˆ(U ∗) ⊑ Ui by
the hypothesis on h; this implies hˆ(V ) ⊑ ⊕(−→Un ) { ⊕ˆ(−→Un ),
which proves the thesis.
• E ⊢ fst(⟨R, S⟩) Efst↪−−−→ R
by a simple case analysis on ℓ we obtain Efst L ℓ { L (1 #
1 # ℓ), where 1 # 1 # ℓ ∈ locs(fst(⟨R, S⟩)); since h ⊩ L ▷
fst(⟨R, S⟩), we obtainV such that hˆ(V ) ⊑ fst⟨R, S⟩1#1#ℓ =
Rℓ , which proves the thesis.
• E ⊢ R S I2.1 T↪−−−−→ R′ S
assume by IH that, for all L′, ifh ⊩ L′ ▷ R, thenh ⊩ T L′ ▷ R′;
we assume ℓ ∈ locs(R′ S ) and proceed by cases:
– ℓ = ϵ : then we have I2.1 T L ϵ
∗
↪→ L ϵ ; since ϵ ∈
locs(R S ) and h ⊩ L ▷ R S , we obtainV such that hˆ(V ) ⊑
R S ϵ = =,R S ; since R S { R′ S , this also implies
hˆ(V ) ⊑ R′ S .
– ℓ = 2 # ℓ1, where ℓ1 ∈ locs(S ): then we have
I2.1 T L (2 # ℓ1)
∗
↪→ L (2 # ℓ1): similarly to the pre-
vious case, we obtain V such that hˆ(V ) ⊑ R S 2#ℓ1 =
S ℓ1 = R′ S 2#ℓ1 , which proves the thesis.
– ℓ = 1 # ℓ1, where ℓ1 ∈ locs(R′): then we have
I2.1 T L (1 # ℓ1)
∗
↪→ T (L ◦ ILoc2.1 ) ℓ1; by Lemma A.5
we prove h ⊩ L ◦ ILoc2.1 ▷ R, and consequently, by IH,
we obtain V such that hˆ(V ) ⊑ R′ℓ1 = R′ S 1#ℓ1 , which
proves the thesis.
□
Definition A.6. Given a relation R on values, we define its exten-
sion to expressions R→ as follows:
M1R→M2 ⇐⇒ (∀V1.M1 ∗↪→ V1 =⇒ ∃V2.M2 ∗↪→ V2 ∧V1RV2)
To prove the soundness theorem for dependency provenance,
we introduce the following notations:
• quasi-equality LM ▷ M ≈a LN ▷ N (Fig. 8)
• substitution for provenance-labelled expressions
(L ▷ M )
{−−−−−→
L′ ▷ N
/−→x } (Fig. 9)
• guarded reduction D ⊢ (L ▷ M ) T↪−→a N (Fig. ??)
• non-guarded reduction D ⊢ (L ▷ M ) T↪−→a¯ N (Fig. ??)
Lemma A.7. Assume LM ▷ M ≈a LN ▷ N . Let L′M , L′N such
that for all ℓ ∈ locs(M ) ∪ locs(N ) we have LM ℓ ⊆→ L′M ℓ and
LN ℓ ⊆→ L′N ℓ. Then L′M ▷ M ≈a L′N ▷ N
Lemma A.8. Suppose LM ▷ M ≈a L′M ▷ M ′ and
−−−−−−→
LN ▷ N ≈a−−−−−−−→
L′N ▷ N
′ (pointwise). Then (LM ▷ M )
{−−−−−−→
LN ▷ N
/−→x } ≈a (L′M ▷
M ′)
{−−−−−−−→
L′N ▷ N
′
/−→x }.
Lemma A.9. Suppose:
EProv2.1 L ▷ f (x ).M1 ≈a EProv2.1 L′ ▷ f (x ).M ′1
EProv1.1 (E
Prov
2.1 L) ▷ M1 ≈a EProv1.1 (EProv2.1 L′) ▷ M ′1
EProv2.2 L ▷ M2 ≈a EProv2.2 L′ ▷ M ′2
Then:
Dβ β ( f (x ).M1,M2) L ▷ M1 [f (x ).M1,M2
/
f ,x]
≈a Dβ β ( f (x ).M ′1,M ′2) L′ ▷ M ′1
[
f (x ).M ′1,M ′2
/
f ,x
]
Proof. Let
LN ▷ N = (E
Prov
1.1 (E
Prov
2.1 L) ▷ M1){
EProv2.1 L ▷ f (x ).M1,E
Prov
2.2 L ▷ M2
/
f ,x
}
L′N ▷ N
′ = (EProv1.1 (EProv2.1 L′) ▷ M ′1){
EProv2.1 L
′ ▷ f (x ).M ′1,EProv2.2 L′ ▷ M ′2
/
f ,x
}
Let us use the following notation:
L ⪯S L′ ⇐⇒ (∀ℓ ∈ S : L ℓ ⊆→ L′ ℓ)
We prove:
LN ⪯locs(N )∪locs(N ′) Dβ β ( f (x ).M1,M2) L
L′N ⪯locs(N )∪locs(N ′) Dβ β ( f (x ).M ′1,M ′2) L′
So, by Lemma A.7, to prove the lemma we only need to show that
LN ▷ N ≈a L′N ▷ N ′
which is a consequence of Lemma A.8. □
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a ∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
L ▷ M ≈a L′ ▷ M ′
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
L ▷ c ≈a L′ ▷ c
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
L ▷ x ≈a L′ ▷ x
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
L ▷ • ≈a L′ ▷ •
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
L ▷ ϵ ≈a L′ ▷ ϵ
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
(En .i L ▷ Mi ≈a En .iL′ ▷ M ′i )i=1...n
L ▷ ⊕(−→Mn ) ≈a L′ ▷ ⊕(−→M ′n )
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
E1.1 L ▷ M ≈a E1.1L′ ▷ M ′
L ▷ f (x ).M ≈a L′ ▷ f (x ).M ′
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
E2.1 L ▷ M1 ≈a E2.1L′ ▷ M ′1
E2.2 L ▷ M2 ≈a E2.2L′ ▷ M ′2
L ▷ M1 M2 ≈a L′ ▷ M ′1 M ′2
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
E1.1 L ▷ M ≈a E1.1L′ ▷ M ′
L ▷ fst(M ) ≈a L′ ▷ fst(M ′)
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
E1.1 L ▷ M ≈a E1.1L′ ▷ M ′
L ▷ snd(M ) ≈a L′ ▷ snd(M ′)
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
E2.1 L ▷ M1 ≈a E2.1L′ ▷ M ′1
E2.2 L ▷ M2 ≈a E2.2L′ ▷ M ′2
L ▷ ⟨M1,M2⟩ ≈a L′ ▷ ⟨M ′1,M ′2⟩
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
E1.1 L ▷ M ≈a E1.1L′ ▷ M ′
L ▷ ∼M ≈a L′ ▷ ∼M ′
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
E2.1 L ▷ M1 ≈a E2.1L′ ▷ M ′1
E2.2 L ▷ M2 ≈a E2.2L′ ▷ M ′2
L ▷ M1 # M2 ≈a L′ ▷ M ′1 # M ′2
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
E3.1 L ▷ M1 ≈a E3.1L′ ▷ M ′1
E3.2 L ▷ M2 ≈a E3.2L′ ▷ M ′2
E3.3 L ▷ M3 ≈a E3.3L′ ▷ M ′3
L ▷ caseM1 of {_ 7→ M2; _ 7→ M3} ≈a
L′ ▷ caseM ′1 of {_ 7→ M ′2; _ 7→ M ′3}
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L′ ϵ
L ▷ ρ (−→x .M ) ≈a L′ ▷ ρ (−→x .M )
Figure 8. Quasi-equality
xi ∈ −→xn
(L ▷ xi )
{−−−−−−→
L′n ▷ Nn
/−→xn} = L′i ▷ Ni
y < −→xn
(L ▷ y)
{−−−−−−→
L′n ▷ Nn
/−→xn} = L ▷ y
{ f ,x } ∩ −→xn = ∅
(EProv1.1 L ▷ M )
{−−−−−−→
L′n ▷ Nn
/−→xn} = L′′ ▷ M ′′
(L ▷ f (x ).M )
{−−−−−−→
L′n ▷ Nn
/−→xn} = IProv1 L′′ (L ϵ ) ▷ f (x ).M ′′
(EProv2.1 L ▷ M1)
{−−−−−−→
L′n ▷ Nn
/−→xn} = L′′1 ▷ M ′′1
(EProv2.2 L ▷ M2)
{−−−−−−→
L′n ▷ Nn
/−→xn} = L′′2 ▷ M ′′2
(L ▷ M1 M2)
{−−−−−−→
L′n ▷ Nn
/−→xn} = IProv2 L′′1 L′′2 (L ϵ ) ▷ M ′′1 M ′′2
Figure 9. Substitution for provenance-labelled expressions (selected cases)
Proof of Theorem 4.9
Suppose L ▷ M ≈a L′ ▷ M ′. Then:
1. If D ⊢ (L ▷ M ) T↪−→a N , we have T L ▷ N ≈a L′ ▷ M ′.
2. If D ⊢ (L ▷ M ) T↪−→a¯ N , there exist T ′, N ′ such that D ⊢
M ′ T
′
↪−→ N ′ and T L ▷ N ≈a T ′ L′. ▷ N ′.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of L ▷ M ≈a L′ ▷
M ′. Selected cases:
• a ∈→ (L ϵ ) ∪ (L′ ϵ )
1. Assume D ⊢ (L ▷ M ) T↪−→a N ; we prove that a ∈→ T L ϵ
(under the dependency view, annotations are monoton-
ically increasing), thus a ∈→ (T L ϵ ) ∪ (L′ ϵ ) and thus
T L ▷ N ≈a L′ ▷ M ′.
2. AssumeD ⊢ (L ▷ M ) T↪−→a¯ N ; by case analysis on the last
rule of this derivation we show that a ̸∈→ L ϵ , reaching
a contradiction
• a ̸∈→ (L ϵ ) ∪ (L′ ϵ ),M = M1 M2
M ′ = M ′1 M ′2
EProv2.i L ▷ Mi ≈EProv2.i L
′ ▷ M ′i for i = 1, 2
1. Assume D ⊢ (L ▷ M1 M2) T↪−→a N ; since a ̸∈→ L ϵ , by
a case analysis on the derivation of reduction we see
that the reduction is happening entirely withinMi (for
i = 1, 2); if i = 1 (the case for i = 2 is similar, for some
T1,N1 we have T = I2.1 T1, N = N1 M2, and
D ⊢ (EProv2.1 L ▷ M1)
T1
↪−→a N1
By IH we have T1 (EProv2.1 L) ▷ N1 ≈a EProv2.1 L′ ▷ M ′1,
thus also T L ▷ N1 M2 ≈a L′ ▷ M ′1 M ′2.
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a ∈→ L ϵ D ⊢ M T↪−→ N
D ⊢ L ▷ M T↪−→a N
D ⊢ EProvn .i L ▷ Mi
T
↪−→a M ′i
D ⊢ L ▷ ⊕(−→Mn )
In .i T
↪−−−−−→a ⊕(M1, . . . ,M ′i , . . . ,Mn )
D ⊢ EProv2.1 L ▷ M
T
↪−→a M ′
D ⊢ L ▷ M N I2.1 T↪−−−−→a M ′ N
D ⊢ EProv2.2 L ▷ N
T
↪−→a N ′
D ⊢ L ▷ M N I2.2 T↪−−−−→a M N ′
D ⊢ EProv2.1 L ▷ M
T
↪−→a M ′
D ⊢ L ▷ ⟨M,N ⟩ I2.1 T↪−−−−→a ⟨M ′,N ⟩
D ⊢ EProv2.2 L ▷ N
T
↪−→a N ′
D ⊢ L ▷ ⟨M,N ⟩ I2.2 T↪−−−−→a ⟨M,N ′⟩
D ⊢ EProv1.1 L ▷ M
T
↪−→a M ′
D ⊢ L ▷ fst(M ) I1.1 T↪−−−−→a fst(M ′)
D ⊢ EProv1.1 L ▷ M
T
↪−→a M ′
D ⊢ L ▷ snd(M ) I1.1 T↪−−−−→a snd(M ′)
D ⊢ EProv3.1 L ▷ M
T
↪−→a M ′
D ⊢ L ▷ caseM ofm I3.1 T↪−−−−→a caseM ′ ofm
Figure 10. Guarded reduction
2. Assume D ⊢ (L ▷ M1 M2) T↪−→a¯ N ; by case analysis on
the last rule of this derivation we show that either the
reduction happened entirely withinM1 orM2 (in which
case the proof is similar to the previous subcase), or
M1 = f (x ).M0 and the reduction is a beta reduction
D ⊢ L ▷ ( f (x ).M0) M2
Dβ (β ρ (f ,x .M0 ))
↪−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→a¯
M0 [f (x ).M0,M2
/
f ,x]
Additionally, a ̸∈→ L [1]. By case analysis on EProv2.1 L ▷
f (x ).M0 ≈EProv2.1 L
′ ▷ M ′1 we proveM ′1 = f (x ).M ′0, with
EProv1.1 (E
Prov
2.1 L) ▷ M0 ≈a EProv1.1 (EProv2.1 L′) ▷ M ′0. Then
we prove:
D ⊢ ( f (x ).M ′0) M ′2
Dβ (β ρ (f ,x .M ′0 ))
↪−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
M ′0
[
f (x ).M ′0,M ′2
/
f ,x
]
Finally, by Lemma A.9, we have:
Dβ (β ρ ( f ,x .M0)) L ▷ M0 [f (x ).M0,M2
/
f ,x] ≈a
Dβ (β ρ ( f ,x .M
′
0)) L
′ ▷ M ′0
[
f (x ).M ′0,M ′2
/
f ,x
]
which proves the thesis
□
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a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L [1]
D ⊢ L ▷ ( f (x ).M ) N Dβ (β ρ (f ,x .M ))↪−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→a¯ M [f (x ).M,N / f ,x]
a ̸∈→ L ϵ
F ⊢ ⊕(−→Vn ) D⊕
−→
Vn
↪−−−−−→ ⊕ˆ(−→Vn )
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L [1]
D ⊢ L ▷ fst(⟨M,N ⟩) Dfst↪−−−→a¯ M
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L [1]
D ⊢ L ▷ snd(⟨M,N ⟩) Dsnd↪−−−→a¯ N
(tt 7→ N ) ∈m
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L [1]
D ⊢ L ▷ case ff ofm Dtt↪−−→a¯ N
(ff 7→ N ) ∈m
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L [1]
D ⊢ L ▷ case ff ofm Dff↪−−→a¯ N
(• 7→ N ) ∈m
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L [1]
D ⊢ L ▷ case • ofm D•↪−−→a¯ N
(∼x 7→ N ) ∈m
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L [1]
D ⊢ L ▷ case ∼M ofm D∼ (β∼ ρ (x .N ))↪−−−−−−−−−−−−−→a¯ N [M /x]
(ϵ 7→ N ) ∈m
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L [1]
D ⊢ L ▷ case ϵ ofm Dϵ↪−−→a¯ N
(h # t 7→ N ) ∈m
a ̸∈→ L ϵ ∪ L [1]
D ⊢ L ▷ caseM1 # M2 ofm
D# (β# ρ (h,t .N ))
↪−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→a¯ N [M1,M2/h, t]
M ℓ = M ′, ϵ M ′ < −→xn a ̸∈→ L ϵ
D ⊢ L ▷ ρ (−→xn .M ) ℓ λ_.⊥↪−−−−→a¯ (n + 1) # ℓ
M ℓ = xi , ℓ′ 1 ≤ i ≤ n a ̸∈→ L ϵ
D ⊢ L ▷ ρ (−→xn .M ) ℓ λ_.⊥↪−−−−→a¯ i # ℓ′
ℓ′ , ϵ
M ℓ = N , ℓ′
a ̸∈→ L ϵ
for all i s.t. 1 ≤ i ≤ n : N , xi
D ⊢ L ▷ ρ (−→xn .M ) ℓ λ_.⊥↪−−−−→a¯ ϵ
D ⊢ EProvn .i L ▷ Mi
T
↪−→a¯ M ′i
D ⊢ L ▷ ⊕(−→Mn )
In .i T
↪−−−−−→a¯ ⊕(M1, . . . ,M ′i , . . . ,Mn )
D ⊢ EProv2.1 L ▷ M
T
↪−→a¯ M ′
D ⊢ L ▷ M N I2.1 T↪−−−−→a¯ M ′ N
D ⊢ EProv2.2 L ▷ N
T
↪−→a¯ N ′
D ⊢ L ▷ M N I2.2 T↪−−−−→a¯ M N ′
D ⊢ EProv2.1 L ▷ M
T
↪−→a¯ M ′
D ⊢ L ▷ ⟨M,N ⟩ I2.1 T↪−−−−→a¯ ⟨M ′,N ⟩
D ⊢ EProv2.2 L ▷ N
T
↪−→a¯ N ′
D ⊢ L ▷ ⟨M,N ⟩ I2.2 T↪−−−−→a¯ ⟨M,N ′⟩
D ⊢ EProv1.1 L ▷ M
T
↪−→a¯ M ′
D ⊢ L ▷ fst(M ) I1.1 T↪−−−−→a¯ fst(M ′)
D ⊢ EProv1.1 L ▷ M
T
↪−→a¯ M ′
D ⊢ L ▷ snd(M ) I1.1 T↪−−−−→a¯ snd(M ′)
D ⊢ EProv3.1 L ▷ M
T
↪−→a¯ M ′
D ⊢ L ▷ caseM ofm I3.1 T↪−−−−→a¯ caseM ′ ofm
Figure 11. Non-guarded reduction
